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APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
LaDawn H. Conway*
Holly M. Church**
I. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS AND OTHER ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
URING the Survey period,1 the Texas Supreme Court continued
its trend of granting mandamus to compel arbitration, to resolve
conflicting court orders regarding jurisdiction, to vacate overly
broad discovery orders, and to remedy erroneous orders disqualifying
counsel.
1. Disqualification Rulings
Historically, mandamus relief has been available to correct an errone-
ous order disqualifying counsel.2 In fact, during the Survey period, the
Texas Supreme Court twice granted writs of mandamus to vacate trial
courts' orders disqualifying counsel. 3 In both instances, the court noted
that disqualification is a severe remedy that can cause immediate harm by
depriving a party of its chosen counsel and disrupting court proceedings. 4
First, in In re Sanders, a divorce and child-custody dispute, the wife
moved to disqualify the husband's attorney, arguing that because he
agreed to partially pay his attorney by performing remodeling work on
her office, his attorney was his employer and thus would be a material
witness in the lawsuit.5 The trial court denied the wife's motion, but a
divided court of appeals ordered disqualification.6 The supreme court
granted mandamus relief to vacate the disqualification order because the
wife failed to show that other sources in the record were insufficient to
establish what the testimony of the husband's attorney would establish.7
* B.G.S., University of Texas at Arlington; J.D. cum laude, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity; Shareholder, Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., University of Texas; J.D. cum laude, Texas Tech University School of Law;
Associate, Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. The Survey period is from October 31, 2004, to October 31, 2005.
2. See In re Epic Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 54 (Tex. 1998) (citing Nat'l Med.
Enters. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 133 (Tex. 1996)).
3. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. 2004); In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P.,
164 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Tex. 2005).
4. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57; In re Cerberus, 164 S.W.3d at 382.
5. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 56.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 57-58.
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Then, in In re Cerberus Capital Management., L.P.,8 a trustee ap-
pointed for WSNet Holdings, Inc. moved to disqualify Vinson & Elkins
("V&E") from representing relators in a shareholder derivative suit
against WSNet based on work V&E had previously done for WSNet.9
Because the relators had obtained a conflict-of-interest waiver in accor-
dance with Disciplinary Rule 1.09, the supreme court found that the dis-
qualification order constituted an abuse of discretion.10
Mandamus, however, is not available to review the denial of a motion
to recuse a trial court judge because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(f)
provides an adequate remedy at law by allowing such a denial to be re-
viewed on appeal from the final judgment.11
2. Compelling Arbitration under the FAA
The supreme court has consistently held that the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration is reviewable by mandamus. 12 During the Survey pe-
riod, the court granted mandamus relief in two separate instances to com-
pel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 13
Most notably, the court for the first time granted mandamus relief to
compel a party to arbitrate that did not sign an arbitration agreement. 14
In In re Weekley Homes, L.P., Forsting contracted with Weekley Homes
to have a home built for himself and his daughter's family. Forsting exe-
cuted a Purchase Agreement, which contained an arbitration clause pro-
viding that any dispute had to be resolved by arbitration. Shortly after he
closed on the home, Forsting transferred the home to a family trust, of
which his daughter was the sole beneficiary. After problems arose with
the home, Forsting, the trust, and his daughter sued Weekley Homes.
The daughter, however, asserted only a personal-injury claim against
Weekley, alleging that repairs made to the home caused her to develop
asthma.15
Weekley moved to compel arbitration under the FAA, but the trial
court refused to compel the daughter to arbitrate because she did not sign
the Purchase Agreement. 16 Ultimately, the supreme court granted man-
damus relief, holding the daughter to the arbitration clause because she
received direct benefits from the Purchase Agreement. As the court ex-
8. In re Cerberus, 164 S.W.3d at 379.
9. Id. at 380-81.
10. Id. at 382-83.
11. In re Lutz, 164 S.W.3d 721, 723-24 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2005, orig. proceeding).
12. See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271-72 (Tex. 1992); In re Nexion
Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex. 2005).
13. In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833, 834 (Tex. 2005) (rejecting a party's contention
that he did not understand the significance of signing a contract, which mandated arbitra-
tion under the FAA, the Texas Supreme Court compelled him to arbitrate his dispute be-
cause he signed the contract); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005).
14. In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 135.
15. Id. at 129.
16. Id. at 129-30.
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plained: "A nonparty cannot both have his contract and defeat it too.' 17
Conflicting opinions have emerged from the courts of appeals regard-
ing whether a trial court abuses its discretion by deferring to rule on a
motion to compel arbitration until after the completion of discovery. The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has held that a trial court does not abuse
its discretion by precluding arbitration until after discovery is com-
pleted,18 whereas the Houston First District Court of Appeals has
granted mandamus relief directing a trial court to vacate its decision to
delay ruling on a motion to compel arbitration until after the completion
of discovery.' 9
In In re Champion Technologies, Inc., the Eastland Court of Appeals
joined the First District Court of Appeals and granted mandamus relief
directing a trial court to vacate its order deferring ruling on a motion to
compel arbitration.20 Delaying a ruling on a motion to compel defeats
the purpose of arbitration-to resolve issues promptly-and forces par-
ties to litigate their dispute even though their claims may be subject to
arbitration.2'
3. Appellate Court Jurisdiction
The Texas Supreme Court has long held that mandamus relief is appro-
priate to resolve conflicting orders asserting jurisdiction over the same
case.22 This Survey period was no different-the court granted manda-
mus three times to resolve conflicting court orders asserting jurisdiction.
For instance, in In re U.S. Silica Co., "[tien silicosis cases involving hun-
dreds of plaintiffs were filed in Cameron County and randomly assigned
to six different courts."'2 3 The first case filed was assigned to the 197th
District Court, which granted the plaintiff's motion to transfer and con-
solidate all ten cases in the 404th District Court.24 The next day, another
court granted the defendants' motion to consolidate all ten cases in the
197th District Court.25 The remaining courts responded in different
ways: one transferred the cases to the 197th District Court, one entered
an anti-transfer order, one recused itself and transferred the case to the
local administrative judge, and one simply did nothing.26 The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals refused to intervene, concluding that the local
17. Id. at 135.
18. CP & Assocs. v. Pickett, 697 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ).
19. In re MHI P'ship, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1999,
orig. proceeding).
20. In re Champion Techs., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, orig.
proceeding).
21. Id. at 599.
22. In re U.S. Silica Co., 157 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Tex. 2005) (citing Bigham v. Dempster,
901 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Tex. 1995)); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985); Curtis v.
Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974).






administrative judge should resolve the dispute among the courts.27 The
Texas Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning and held
that enforcing or overruling competing orders is the duty of a higher
court. 28 Guided by the local rules that permit a unilateral transfer only
by the court in which the first case was filed, the high court ordered the
other courts to vacate their orders and allow the 197th District Court to
proceed. 29
The Texas Supreme Court also granted mandamus relief to vacate or-
ders by probate courts transferring cases without statutory authority.30 In
In re Reliant Energy, Inc., the widow of a power-plant worker killed on
the job filed a wrongful-death and survival action against Reliant in Hi-
dalgo County probate court. 31 Reliant moved to transfer the action to
Harris County, the location of Reliant's principal place of business. 32 The
widow then filed the same wrongful-death and survival action in Harris
County and successfully petitioned the Hidalgo County probate court to
transfer the newly filed Harris County action to itself.33
The supreme court held that in a wrongful-death or personal injury
case, the venue provisions of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code are paramount, not section 5B of the Probate Code.34 Because
the Hidalgo County probate court transferred the Harris County action
to itself without statutory authority, the Texas Supreme Court granted
mandamus to vacate the Hidalgo County transfer order.35
The supreme court similarly granted mandamus relief to enforce com-
pliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA").36 In Powell v.
Stover, the court granted mandamus to resolve two states' claims to juris-
diction over a child-custody case.37 After living in Texas for over 12
years, the Powell family (husband, wife, and one child) moved to Tennes-
see.38 Almost a year later, the wife-then pregnant with their second
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 439.
30. See, e.g., In re Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 2005); In re Wilson
N. Jones Mem'l Hosp., 159 S.W.3d 629, 630 (Tex. 2005); In re Terex Corp., 159 S.W.3d 630,
630 (Tex. 2005). The Texas Supreme Court also exercised jurisdiction over two interlocu-
tory appeals in Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2005) involving the
same parties and issues in In re Reliant Energy, Inc. The Texas Supreme Court had con-
flicts jurisdiction to review the interlocutory appeals because (1) there were dissents in the
court of appeals; and (2) the court of appeals' opinion held differently from another court
of appeals opinion, which resulted in uncertainty in the law. Gonzalez, 159 S.W.3d at 619-
20 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(e) (Vernon 2005)).
31. In re Reliant, 159 S.W.3d at 625.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 626.
35. Id.
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child-moved back to Texas with the child and filed for divorce. 39 Two
weeks later, the husband filed for divorce in Tennessee, and the Tennes-
see court held that it had jurisdiction over the child.40 In the meantime,
the second child was born, in Texas. The husband then filed a plea in
abatement in Texas and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, argu-
ing that the Tennessee court had jurisdiction over the divorce. 41 The trial
court denied the plea in abatement because both children were born in
Texas, and the home state of the youngest child was Texas.42 The Texas
Supreme Court held that even though the older child was born in Texas
and lived there nearly 12 years before the move to Tennessee, the child's
home state was Tennessee under the UCCJEA because the child had
lived in Tennessee with his parents for at least 6 consecutive months
before the child-custody proceeding was commenced.43
Finally, while an appellate court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of man-
damus only against an entity other than a trial court when it needs to
enforce its jurisdiction over a pending appeal, a writ of mandamus may
not be issued against a district clerk for failure to file an original petition
in a matter not affecting a pending appeal. 44
4. Discovery
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court granted manda-
mus relief to vacate an erroneous order to disclose privileged docu-
ments. 45 In In re Living Centers of Texas, Inc., Cline sued Living Centers
for medical malpractice and served Living Centers with requests for pro-
duction.46 Living Centers asserted the medical peer-review privilege and
the quality-assessment and assurance privilege to several documents. 47
Thereafter, the Living Centers privilege committee submitted a privilege
log and representative sample of the documents to be reviewed in camera
by the trial court.48 After a limited review, the court ordered the produc-
tion of all documents that lacked a privilege stamp and that did not have
the word "committee" in the name.49 The supreme court granted manda-
mus relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by using su-
perficial indicators to overrule privilege objections.50
Mandamus is also appropriate to cure orders compelling discovery be-
yond that permitted by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 51 For exam-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 324.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 323.
44. In re Hayes, No. 07-05-0262-CV, 2005 WL 1743821. at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
July 25, 2005, orig. proceeding).





50. Id. at 262.
51. 158 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, orig. proceeding).
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pie, in In re Elmer, the San Antonio Court of Appeals vacated a trial
court's order compelling discovery in aid of judgment under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 621a because the order was made in the absence of a
final, appealable judgment in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
621a.5 2
5. Forcing Courts to Rule on Pending Motions
Mandamus is appropriate to compel a trial court to rule on a motion
properly filed and pending before a court after a reasonable time has
passed and the movant has requested that the court rule on the motion.5 3
6. Forum Selection Clauses
Mandamus relief is appropriate when a lower court fails to enforce a
forum-selection clause.54 In In re Automated Collection Technologies,
Inc., PSC filed suit against Automated in Texas, despite a written contract
providing that Montgomery County, Pennsylvania was the exclusive juris-
diction for any dispute over the contract. 5 5 Four months after appearing
in the case, asserting counterclaims, and serving discovery on PSC, Auto-
mated moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on the forum-selection
clause. 56 Rejecting PSC's arguments that the forum-selection clause was
permissive and that Automated waived enforcement of the clause
through its inconsistent act of seeking affirmative relief in a Texas court,
the Texas Supreme Court directed the trial court to dismiss the case
based on the forum-selection clause. 57 In response to PSC's argument
that dismissal would result in an unnecessary duplication of time and re-
sources, the court noted that PSC could hardly complain about such du-
plication when it chose to file the lawsuit in a forum other that the one to
which it had contractually agreed. 58
7. Continuances
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed, for the
first time, the scope of the Waites exception to mandatory legislative con-
52. Id.
53. See In re Greenwell, 160 S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, orig. pro-
ceeding) (granting mandamus to order the trial court to rule on a pending motion for
partial summary judgment that the judge refused to rule on and had been pending for over
six months); In re Garrett, No. 07-05-0141-CV, 2005 WL 1038860, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo May 3, 2005, orig. proceeding) ("While it may be that a trial court has the minis-
terial duty to act upon motions pending before it, authority accords it a reasonable time
within which to act.") In this case, the court of appeals denied mandamus relief to force a
trial court to rule on a post-judgment motion where the relator sought mandamus relief
during the 75-day post-judgment period before such motions would be overruled by opera-
tion of law. The court could not say as a matter of law that withholding action before the
expiration of that time constituted unreasonable delay. Id.
54. 156 S.W.3d 557, 558 (Tex. 2004).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 558-59.
57. Id. at 559.
58. Id. at 560.
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tinuances.5 9 Under section 30.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, "a court [must] grant a motion for continuance if an attorney rep-
resenting a party is a member of the legislature and will be attending a
legislative session."'60 In Waites v. Sondock, the Texas Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional limitation on this section by holding that a
legislative continuance is not mandatory if the party opposing the contin-
uance alleges that a substantial existing right will be defeated or abridged
by delay. 61 In In re Ford Motor Co., Fuentes, a woman rendered paraple-
gic after an accident, sued Ford and Goodyear Tire for damages arising
from alleged tire failure.62 Counsel for Ford met the statutory require-
ments for a legislative continuance; however, Fuentes opposed the mo-
tion because her temporary funding for rehabilitation services would end
soon and any continuance would prevent her from access to medical
care. 63 The supreme court held that the Waites exception did not apply
because, in the absence of a final judgment against Ford, Fuentes had no
substantial existing right to access to medical care enforceable against
Ford.64
The Amarillo Court of Appeals was faced with a similar continuance
issue in the mandamus context and granted mandamus relief to remedy
an erroneous grant of a grace period not authorized by law. 65 In In re
Brown, Brown moved to dismiss Fraley's expert report claiming that it
was insufficient under Article 13.01(r) of the Texas Revised Statutes. 66
Fraley argued that the expert report was sufficient, but in the that event
the trial court disagreed, Fraley moved for a 30-day grace period under
section 13.01(g) based on his mistaken belief that the report was suffi-
cient.67 As the supreme court explained in Walker v. Guterrez, "Section
13.01(g) requires a trial court to grant a grace period if... the court finds
that the" inadequacy of the expert report "was not intentional or the re-
sult of conscious indifference but was the result of an accident or mis-
take."'68 Attempting to apply this standard in In re Brown, the trial court
found that the expert report did not satisfy standard of care and causation
elements and granted Fraley the 30-day grace period.69 The Amarillo
Court of Appeals, however, reversed, directing the trial court to vacate
the grace period because a belief by Fraley and his attorney that the re-
port complied with section 13.01(r)(6), although it actually lacked the
standard-of-care element, was not sufficient to support a finding of acci-
59. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. 2005).
60. Id. at 317-18.
61. 561 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. 1977).
62. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 317.
63. Id. at 319-20.
64. Id. at 320.
65. In re Brown, 190 S.W.3d 4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2005, orig. proceeding).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 62-63 (Tex. 2003).
69. In re Brown, 190 S.W.3d at 4.
2006]
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dent or mistake. 70
8. Appellate Procedure
In In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAlien, Inc., the Texas
Supreme Court granted mandamus relief to vacate a trial court's order
allowing execution before the entry of final judgment.71 After Garcia ob-
tained a default judgment against Burlington for negligence damages, the
trial court granted Burlington a new trial. 72 Garcia argued that the order
granting a new trial was void for lack of jurisdiction because the trial
court's plenary power had expired. 73 Shortly thereafter, the court en-
tered a docket notation that the new trial was cancelled.74 Garcia then
attempted to enforce her judgment through execution, and Burlington
put funds in the court's registry to prevent execution.75 The trial court
denied Burlington's motion to quash execution and ordered release of
the funds.76
The Texas Supreme Court held that the default judgment was interloc-
utory and could not be enforced through execution. 77 Because the judg-
ment was interlocutory, the trial court retained jurisdiction to set it aside
by granting Burlington's motion for new trial.78 Further, when the trial
court permitted execution, there was no judgment in effect. 79 The trial
court vacated the default judgment by granting the motion for new trial,
and the docket entry canceling the new trial did not set aside the order
granting a new trial.80
9. Expiration of Plenary Power
In In re Goss, the Texarkana Court of Appeals stated that "Mandamus
is appropriate relief when a trial court issues an order after its plenary
power has expired, because such an order is void." 81 After Goss obtained
a favorable jury verdict against Brookshire, Brookshire filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial.82 The
trial court denied both motions, but impliedly granted permission to
Brookshire to file an amended motion.83 Brookshire filed another mo-
tion for new trial almost two months after the trial court's ruling, and the
70. Id. at 6-7.
71. 167 S.W.3d 827, 828 (Tex. 2005).
72. Id. at 828-29.








81. 160 S.W.3d 288, 289 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding); In re Sw. Bell
Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000).
82. In re Goss, 160 S.W.3d at 289.
83. Id. at 291.
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trial court granted it.84 The court of appeals granted mandamus to vacate
the trial court's order because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b gives a
court plenary power only for another 30 days after it overrules a motion
for new trial.8 5 Thus, the trial court had lost plenary power before it
granted Brookshire's second motion for new trial.8 6
10. Exceeding Court Authority
In In re El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., the El Paso Court of Appeals
granted mandamus relief to vacate a trial court's order requiring that the
relator retain local counsel within seven days or be forced to used ap-
pointed local counsel.8 7 Finding an abuse of discretion, the court of ap-
peals first observed that no El Paso County local rule required "out-of-
town licensed Texas attorneys to appear with local counsel before a state
court in El Paso County" or authorized the trial court to appoint local
counsel for a party already represented by counsel. 88 The court of ap-
peals further acknowledged the right of a litigant to be represented by
counsel of their choice.89 Rejecting the argument that section 24.016 of
the Texas Government Code authorized the trial court to appoint coun-
sel, the court of appeals noted that the order made no appointment of
counsel, and thus that issue was not before the court.90 Further, no statu-
tory authority to appoint counsel in civil cases exists.91 The appellate
court concluded that a trial court's inherent power to appoint counsel is
contingent upon a party's indigent status and the existence of exceptional
circumstances, none of which were applicable in El Paso Healthcare.92
11. Mandatory Venue
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court construed for the
first time section 15.020 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 93
In In re Texas Ass'n of School Boards, Inc., the TASB sought mandamus
relief to have a suit against them transferred to Travis County based on a
contractual choice-of-venue provision.94 Under section 15.020, if there is
a written agreement in a suit arising from a major transaction that pro-
vides for venue in a particular county, "suit must be brought in that
county. '95 A major transaction is one that is "evidenced by a written
agreement under which a person pays or receives, or is obligated to pay
84. Id. at 289-90.
85. Id. at 291-92.
86. Id. at 292.
87. No. 08-05-00098-CV, 2005 WL 2241024, at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso Sept. 15, 2005,
orig. proceeding).
88. Id. at *5.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *6.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 169 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex. 2005).
94. Id. at 654.
95. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020 (Vernon 2005)).
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or receive, consideration with an aggregate stated value equal to or
greater than $1 million."'96
In the underlying lawsuit, BISD and the Fund entered into an agree-
ment, whereby BISD made an annual contribution to the Fund in the
amount of $41,973 and the Fund in exchange provided coverage for po-
tential losses or liabilities in excess of $17 million. 97 BISD sued TASB
and the Fund for indemnity for water and physical damage to school-
district buildings.98 The trial court denied the Fund and TASB's motion
to transfer venue to Travis County.99 In denying mandamus relief, the
Texas Supreme Court explained that the mandatory venue provision of
section 15.020 did not apply to the agreement because the aggregate
stated value was $41,973, the amount of the annual contribution for as-
sumption of the risk of loss, not the coverage limits. 100
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Interlocutory Appeals in the Texas Supreme Court
a. Conflicts Jurisdiction
While jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is generally final in the
courts of appeals, Texas Government Code section 22.225(c) grants con-
flicts jurisdiction to the Texas Supreme Court "if the court of appeals
'holds differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals or of
the [Texas] [S]upreme [C]ourt."' 101 To determine whether conflicts juris-
diction applies, the test "is whether the decision in one case would oper-
ate to overrule the decision in another case on the same question of law if
both were rendered by the same court.' 10 2
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court exercised its con-
flicts jurisdiction numerous times to resolve courts of appeals decisions
inconsistent with supreme court authority. For instance, the court
granted two petitions for review, requiring the lower courts to observe
the prerequisites for class certification as set forth in Southwestern Refin-
96. Id. (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020).
97. Id. at 655.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 656.
100. Id. at 659-60.
101. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d 550, 553-54 (Tex.
2004) ("Our conflicts jurisdiction arises when, applying the same standards, two decisions
cannot stand together; that is, one decision would operate to overrule the other had it been
issued by the same court."); Hoff v. Nueces County, 153 S.W.3d 45, 47 (Tex. 2004) ("This
Court has jurisdiction because the court of appeals' decision conflicts or holds differently
from a prior decision of this Court on a question of law material to a decision of the
case.")); N. Am. Mortgage Co. v. O'Hara, 153 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Tex. 2004) ("We have juris-
diction over this interlocutory appeal because of the direct conflict between the court of
appeals' judgment and our opinion in Bernal."); Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159
S.W.3d 615, 619-20 (Tex. 2005) ("We have jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals
because there were dissents in the court of appeals and because the court of appeals' opin-
ion expressly declined to follow and conflicts with the holding in [another court of appeals
case].").
102. Hoff, 153 S.W.3d at 47.
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ing Co. v. Bernal.'0 3 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that all
class actions must satisfy four threshold requirements: (1) numerosity; (2)
commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. 10 4 In ad-
dition to these threshold requirements, "class actions must satisfy at least
one of the four subdivisions of Rule 42(b). °10 5 The supreme court held in
Bernal that a trial court cannot certify a class without performing a rigor-
ous analysis of the prerequisites for class certification and without indi-
cating how the claims will likely be tried. 10 6
In State Farm Mutual Automotive Insurance Co. v. Lopez, State Farm
policyholders sued State Farm, asserting a right to a surplus of funds
under their policies, and moved to certify a class of all State Farm policy-
holders from 1994 until the time of trial.10 7 State Farm opposed the mo-
tion, arguing that "Illinois law govern[ed] the action and would operate
to bar the class representatives' claims."'01 8 State Farm further contended
that "the class representatives could not adequately represent the class"
because of irreconcilable economic conflicts between "present policy-
holders .. . , who [were] more interested in assuring that adequate
reserves are available to pay claims, and past policyholders, who [were]
more interested in receiving maximum dividend payments."'1 9 Despite
State Farm's contentions, the trial court granted the policyholders' mo-
tion to certify, but limited the class to all Texas policyholders from 1994 to
the time of trial."t 0
The court of appeals affirmed certification, and on rehearing, held that
(1) State Farm had waived any argument that Bernal required a trial plan
for certification, and (2) Bernal did not require a trial plan in every certi-
fication order.1 ' The supreme court initially dismissed State Farm's peti-
tion for review for want of jurisdiction, finding that the court's statement
that a trial plan was unnecessary was mere dicta because the court of
appeals first determined that State Farm waived the issue by not raising
it.112 However, on rehearing, the court granted review because the court
of appeals had made alternative holdings-waiver and the unnecessity of
the trial plan-and thus, the appellate court's holding that a trial plan was
unnecessary could not be reconciled with Bernal." 3 The court concluded
103. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d at 555 ("Because the trial court's certification order addressed
neither the choice-of-law issue State Farm raised nor the potential antagonism between
present and past policyholders, it failed to reflect the rigorous analysis that we require for
all class-certification prerequisites ...."); O'Hara, 153 S.W.3d at 43 ("We hold that it was
error to order the class certified before a trial plan was prepared.").
104. 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d at 552.
108. Id. at 555.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 553.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 554.
113. Id. at 554-55. The court changed its opinion based on its holding in Tex. Natural
Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001).
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that the trial court abused its discretion by certifying the class without
formulating a trial plan or rigorously applying the requirements of Rule
42.114
The supreme court similarly exercised conflicts jurisdiction in Hoff v.
Nueces County.115 In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether
the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution barred a law-
suit brought by current and former employees of the Nueces County
Sheriff's Department. 116 The trial court held that sovereign immunity did
not bar the employees' claims; however, the court of appeals held that
Nueces County possessed Eleventh Amendment immunity.117 The su-
preme court accepted the interlocutory appeal, relying on cases wherein
it had held that cities and counties are not entitled to Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity.11 8 Although "Eleventh Amendment immunity has been
extended to state agencies that are viewed as arms of the state," courts
must consider the nature of the entity seeking immunity to determine
whether it should be treated as an arm of the state." 119 Because Texas
counties may levy taxes, sell or lease real property, and issue bonds, they
are not arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes.1 20
b. Statutory Jurisdiction
Under Texas Government Code section 22.225(d), the Texas Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to review a trial court's denial of a media defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation case.121 In The
Hearst Corp. v. Skeen,122 the supreme court exercised this jurisdiction,
holding that the public figures asserting defamation "failed to raise a fact
issue on actual malice, [and] the media defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment." In Hearst Corp., three Smith County prosecutors filed
suit against the publisher and the author of an article about aggressive
prosecutors and sentences in Smith County.123 To survive summary judg-
ment, the prosecutors needed to establish actual malice, namely that
"Hearst and Moore published the article with either knowledge of [its]
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 1 24 The prosecutors alleged
that Moore and Hearst relied on a relatively insignificant amount of cases
for the article, "avoided the truth, relied on dubious information from
bias sources, deviated from professional standards of care, and were mo-
tivated to fabricate.' '125
114. Id. at 557.
115. 153 S.W.3d at 45, 47 (Tex. 2004).
116. Id. at 46-47.
117. Id. at 47.
118. Id. at 48.
119. Id. at 49.
120. Id. at 50.
121. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(d) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2005).
122. 159 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. 2005).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 637.
125. Id.
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The evidence, however, established that "Moore's five months of re-
search involved interviewing parties on both sides . . . and reviewing the
court records of the cases discussed."' 126 Further, because no sources of
evidence existed to easily disprove the criticisms in the article, the evi-
dence did not support a purposeful avoidance theory.1 27 Finally, Moore
and Hearst had a great deal of evidence corroborating the criticisms in
the article, and thus, no fact issue existed as to whether Moore relied on
doubtful sources of information. 128
2. Interlocutory Appeals in the Courts of Appeals
If there is no final appealable order, the courts of appeals only have
"jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals as authorized by statute. '129
In Academy of Oriental Medicine, L.L.C. v. Andra,130 two healthcare
providers appealed the district court's denial of their motion to strike
their former patient's expert report. The court of appeals determined
that the healthcare providers' motion was filed for relief under section
74.351(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides
that "a court shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert
report ... if it ... does not represent a good faith effort to comply with
the definition of an expert report in Subsection (r)(6). '1 31 In healthcare-
liability claims, the grant of jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal in sec-
tion 51.014(a)(10) is limited to an order that "grants relief sought by a
motion under Section 74.351(l)."132 Because the healthcare providers
sought relief from an order denying (as opposed to granting) such relief,
the court of appeals could not exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. 133
In In re Nikolouzos,13 4 the court of appeals had no jurisdiction over the
interlocutory order, but due to exigent and sympathetic circumstances,
the court temporarily accepted the appeal. In that case, Mrs. Nikolouzos
filed directly in the First District Court of Appeals a notice of appeal and
petition for writ of injunction on Saturday to prevent St. Luke's Episco-
pal Hospital from taking her husband off of life support. 35 "Because the
notice of appeal was filed directly with [the court, rather than the trial
court clerk,] on a Saturday and an emergency existed," the court of ap-
peals "accepted the notice of appeal ... and issued a writ of injunction to
prevent the appeal from becoming moot.' 36 However, on the following
Monday, the clerk of the First District Court of Appeals "sent a copy of
126. Id. at 638.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 638-39.
129. Acad. of Oriental Med., L.L.C. v. Andra, 173 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Tex. App.-Austin
2005, no pet. h.).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 186-87.
132. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(10) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
133. Acad. of Oriental Med., L.L.C., 173 S.W.3d at 187, 189.
134. 179 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).




the notice of appeal to the trial-court clerk," who then "randomly as-
signed the appeal to the Fourteenth [District] Court of Appeals," thus
depriving the First District court of jurisdiction.137 Accordingly, the First
District court dismissed the appeal.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jennings disagreed with the majority's
reasoning in dismissing the appeal, arguing that the court of appeals
"never had jurisdiction [in the first place] to review the interlocutory de-
nial of the applications for a temporary restraining order. ' 138 Specifi-
cally, "appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider . .. appeals of
interlocutory orders 'only if a statute explicitly provides [the] jurisdic-
tion."1 39 No statutory authority provides jurisdiction to appellate courts
to review temporary restraining orders. 40 While "a temporary injunction
is an appealable interlocutory order" and the appeal of a temporary re-
straining order is permitted if "the force and effect... is indistinguishable
from that of a temporary injunction," it is only appealable if relief is
granted, not denied. 41 In an opinion issued a few days later, the Four-
teenth District Court of Appeals agreed with the First District Court of
Appeal's concurring opinion. 142
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(7) provides
that an order granting or denying a special appearance is an interlocu-
tory, appealable order.143 Such appeals are accelerated, and thus must be
brought within 20 days after the interlocutory order is signed. A motion
for new trial will not extend the time to perfect an accelerated appeal. 144
In addition, "the denial of a plea to the trial court's jurisdiction based on
lack of proper notice under the Texas Tort Claims Act may not serve as a
basis for interlocutory appeal," "because a lack of notice is not
jurisdictional."1 45
II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT
To preserve error for appeal, the record must show a specific, timely
objection and a ruling from the trial court. 146 With respect to preserving
error in the admission of testimony at trial, the general rule is that error is
deemed harmless and waived "if the objecting party subsequently permits
137. Id. at 581-82.
138. Id. at 582-83 (Jennings, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 582 (quoting Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Nikolouzos v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 681-82 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.). In any event, in a concurring opinion, Judge Fowler
stated that, even if the court of appeals had jurisdiction, the appellant would not have
prevailed because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the temporary
restraining order. Id. at 682-83 (Fowler, J., concurring).
143. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
144. Digges v. Knowledge Alliance, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 463, 463-64 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
145. Metro Transit Auth. v. Salazar, 175 S.W.3d 804, 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
146. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
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the same or similar evidence to be introduced without objection.' '1 47
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that, if
specific enough, a "running objection" can preserve error in the admis-
sion of testimony for more than one witness. 148 To do so, however, the
initial objection must comply with Rule 33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure, and the requested "running objection" must clearly
identify "the source of the objectionable testimony, the subject matter of
the witness's testimony and the ways the testimony would be brought
before the jury.'1 4 9 Under these circumstances, a "running objection"
expressly recognized by a trial court can preserve error. 150
The Texas Supreme Court further clarified the procedure for preserv-
ing error in the jury selection process. The supreme court explained that,
"when a challenge for cause is denied, a party must use a peremptory
challenge against the veniremember involved, exhaust its remaining chal-
lenges, and notify the trial court that a specific objectionable
veniremember will remain on the jury list."' 151 Notably, the litigant does
not have to state why the remaining veniremember is objectionable; how-
ever, the notice must be given before the jury is seated, so that the trial
court has time to determine if the litigant was in fact forced to take objec-
tionable jurors. 152 Also, significantly, if a trial court errs in denying a
challenge for cause, the error is presumed harmful because the court on
appeal "cannot know for certain that [the objectionable juror's] inclusion
did not affect the verdict.' 1 53
As a general rule, to be "timely," an objection must be made when the
objectionable conduct occurs. This is unless "the conduct or comment
cannot be rendered harmless by proper instruction.' 1 54 For example, in
General Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, defense counsel was not required to
immediately object when the plaintiff, Mrs. Iracheta, stood and thanked
the jury at the beginning of her lawyer's closing argument. 155 Counsel
instead properly waited until the lawyer's argument ended to move for a
mistrial at the bench. 156 The supreme court concluded that not only was
the defense counsel's objection timely under the circumstances, but also
that it was not even necessary: "A party's personal expression of grati-
tude to the jury at the close of a case is error that cannot be repaired and
therefore need not be objected to.' 57




151. Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87, 90-91 (Tex. 2005).
152. See id. at 91.
153. Id.
154. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).
155. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. 2005).
156. Id. The supreme court recognized that defense counsel "was not required to ob-ject to a grandmother's expression of appreciation on behalf of her deceased daughter and





An objection may also be "timely" if the error is not apparent until
after the evidence comes in. For example, in Iracheta, the supreme court
held the reliability of an expert's testimony may not become apparent
until the end of cross-examination. 158 While an objection must be timely,
"it need not anticipate a deficiency before it is apparent. 159
III. JUDGMENT FORMATION
During the Survey period, Texas courts grappled with judgment-forma-
tion issues, including the calculation of prejudgment interest in the wake
of House Bill 4's amendments to the Texas Finance Code. Specifically, in
Pringle v. Moon,160 a personal-injury case, the trial court applied the
higher, pre-amendment interest rates to a judgment entered October 30,
2003, even though the new interest rate applies in cases in which a final
judgment is "signed or subject to appeal on or after September 1, 2003,"
the effective date of the amendments. The appellee in Pringle argued
that the prejudgment interest award was correct because the trial court
had originally entered judgment on July 7, 2003, and the October 30, 2003
judgment "related back" to the July judgment. 161
The court of appeals rejected the appellee's argument, noting that the
trial court had expressly vacated the July judgment, and a judgment that
has been vacated has no legal effect. 162 "The October 30 judgment could
not relate back because the July 7 judgment no longer existed.1 63 Be-
cause the final judgment was signed after the effective date of the
amended Finance Code, the new (and lower) interest rate applied.1 64
The appellant in Pringle also complained that "the trial court [had] im-
properly calculated prejudgment interest on the entire amount of dam-
ages found by the jury rather than the amount awarded to [the counter-
plaintiff] after [a] credit for [a] worker's compensation lien." 165 The court
of appeals agreed, holding that "[p]rejudgment interest is calculated on
the judgment amount, not the amount of damages awarded by the
jury. 1 66 Accordingly, "[a]ny credits or offsets due a defendant should be
deducted from the total damages awarded before-not after-prejudg-
ment interest is calculated. 1 167 In Pringle, therefore, prejudgment inter-
est should have been calculated on the amount of the damages that the
158. Id. at 741.
159. Id. ("The unreliability of expert opinions may be apparent as early as the discovery
process but also may not emerge until trial, during or after the expert's testimony, or even
later.").
160. 158 S.W.3d 607, 609-10 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
161. See id. at 610.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 611.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 810 S.W.2d 259, 275 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ granted), af-jd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 903 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1994)).
167. Id.
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jury awarded less the offsetting credit for the worker's compensation
lien.' 68
IV. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
In Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care System, 169 the Texas Supreme
Court clarified a number of important issues related to extending the ap-
pellate timetable. In that case, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed a motion for new
trial. Thereafter, in a single order, the trial court (1) granted the plain-
tiff's motion for new trial, (2) reconsidered the defendant's motion for
summary judgment in light of new evidence submitted by the plaintiff,
and (3) again granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 170
The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 90 days later. The court of appeals
considered the merits of the plaintiff's appeal after concluding that her
"motion for new trial 'assailed' the second judgment and therefore ex-
tended the appellate deadlines.' 17 1
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 72 The Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure allow appellate courts to "treat actions taken before an appealable
order is signed as relating to an appeal of that order and [to] give them
effect as if they had been taken after the order was signed."'1 73 Further,
the Rules of Civil Procedure allow a prematurely-filed motion for new
trial to assail a subsequent judgment. 174 But what about a motion for
new trial that has been ruled on? Can it "assail" a subsequent judgment
for purposes of extending the appellate deadlines? According to the su-
preme court in Wilkins, it depends.
First, the supreme court clarified that a premature motion for new trial
that has not been ruled on "generally operates to extend the appellate
timetable as to the judgment that it assails."'1 75 Second, the supreme
court resolved a split among the courts of appeals on whether the prema-
ture-filing rules apply only to "live" pleadings-for instance, a motion for
new trial that has not been expressly denied or overruled by operation of
law. 176 The supreme court determined that there is no "live" pleading
requirement in the premature-filing rules unless the premature motion
for new trial has become moot (as discussed below).' 77 Accordingly, a
motion for new trial that has been expressly denied or overruled by oper-
ation of law can still "assail" a subsequent judgment for purposes of ex-
168. Id.
169. 160 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2005).
170. Id. at 561.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 564.
173. TEX. R. App. P. 27.2.
174. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306c.
175. Wilkins, 160 S.W.3d at 562.
176. Id. (citing A.G. Solar & Co. v. Nordyke, 744 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Estrada, 831 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)).
177. Id. at 563.
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tending the appellate timetable. 178
Finally, the supreme court concluded that there is a "live" pleading re-
quirement in the premature-filing rules when the premature motion has
become moot.179 For example, a motion for new trial that has been
granted becomes moot as to any effect that it may have on a subsequent
judgment because the relief sought in the motion was granted. Accord-
ingly, "a motion for new trial that has been granted cannot 'assail' a sub-
sequent judgment for purposes of determining the deadline for filing a
notice of appeal. 180 Those were the circumstances in Wilkins-the mo-
tion for new trial was granted and could not assail the subsequent judg-
ment. Accordingly, the appellate deadlines did not extend, the notice of
appeal filed ninety days after the second judgment was late, and the ap-
pellate courts had no jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of the appeal.181
As in Wilkins, In re Goss' 82 involved a ruling on a premature motion
for new trial. The appellant filed a post-verdict, but pre-judgment, mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, a motion
for new trial. At the hearing on the motions, the trial court entered judg-
ment. Typically, a premature motion for new trial like the appellant's in
Goss would "assail" the subsequent judgment, languish until overruled by
operation of law 75 days after judgment, and operate to extend the appel-
late deadlines in the usual manner. Unfortunately, the day after entering
judgment, the trial court in Goss signed an order expressly overruling the
combined motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new
trial. Twenty-eight days later, the appellant filed a second motion for new
trial. A few weeks later, the trial court held a hearing and granted the
appellant's second motion for new trial.18 3
On mandamus, the Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court acted outside its plenary power in granting the new trial. 184
The court based its conclusion on the provisions of Rule 329b of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that a trial court "[retains]
plenary power over its judgment until 'thirty days after all such timely-
filed motions [for new trial] are overruled, either by a written and signed
order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first."' 18 5 Because the
appellant's prematurely-filed motion for a new trial in Goss assailed the
subsequently entered judgment, it was effective to extend the appellate
timetable. However, the trial court expressly overruled the motion the
day after judgment, triggering the time restraints of Rule 329b as well as
the supreme court's holding in In re Dickason: "once the trial court over-
rules a motion for new trial, the court retains plenary jurisdiction for an-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 564.
181. See id.
182. 160 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding).
183. Id. at 289.
184. ld.
185. Id. at 290.
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other thirty days, and. . . 'filing an amended motion for new trial does not
extend the court's plenary power.'"186 As a result, the appellant's second
motion for new trial in Goss did not operate to extend the trial court's
jurisdiction, and the court acted outside its plenary authority in granting
the motion.18 7
V. FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court applied the princi-
ples of Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.18 8 in the default-judgment context. In
In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc.,189 the trial
court entered a default judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claim, but
did not address her request for exemplary damages. The default judg-
ment, however, contained a Mother Hubbard Clause, stating that "all
other relief not expressly granted is hereby denied," awarded pre- and
post-judgment interest, and ordered that the plaintiff was "entitled to en-
force this judgment through abstract, execution and any other process
necessary." 190 With two justices dissenting, the supreme court held the
default judgment interlocutory, reversing the lower courts. 191
In so holding, the supreme court reiterated that the presumption of
finality in a judgment following a trial on the merits does not exist follow-
ing a summary or default judgment. 192 Instead, "a default judgment that
fails to dispose of all claims can be final only if 'intent to finally dispose of
the case' is 'unequivocally expressed in the words of the order itself." 1 93
The default judgment in Burlington failed to meet this criterion. First, as
established in Lehmann, a Mother Hubbard clause in a default judgment
does not establish finality.1 94 Further, language permitting execution
does not "'unequivocally express' finality in the absence of a judgment
that actually disposes of all parties and all claims. '195 Unequivocal lan-
guage expressing finality would state, for example, "This judgment finally
disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable. '1 96 In addition,
the supreme court stressed the importance of reading a judgment "in light
of the importance of preserving a party's right to appeal.' 197 If finality is
implied from "anything less than an unequivocal expression, a party's
right to appeal may be jeopardized."1 98 Finding no such "unequivocal
186. Id. at 290-91 (citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998)).
187. Id. at 292.
188. 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).
189. 167 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. 2005).
190. Id. at 828-30, 832.
191. Id. at 829, 832.
192. Id. at 829.
193. Id. at 830.
194. Id. at 829-30 (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 203-04 (Tex.
2001)).
195. Id. at 830.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 830. The dissenting justices argued that the awards of pre- and post-judg-
ment interest, coupled with the language permitting execution, indicated finality. Id. at 832
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expression" in Burlington, the supreme court held the default judgment
interlocutory and not subject to execution. 199
VI. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
Once a party has attempted to invoke appellate court jurisdiction, it is
the court of appeals, not the trial court, which has the power to determine
appellate jurisdiction. For example, in Tri-Steel Structures, Inc. v. Baptist
Foundation of Texas,200 the trial court struck the appellant's notice of ap-
peal after concluding that the notice was filed without proper authority
under Rule 12 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a party
to a lawsuit to challenge the prosecuting party's authority to act. The
court of appeals rebuked this action, holding that once a party attempts
to invoke appellate jurisdiction, the court of appeals, not the trial court,
decides whether appellate jurisdiction was properly invoked. 20 1
VII. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 13.1 provides that, absent an agree-
ment of the parties, a court reporter must make a full record of all pro-
ceedings.20 2  The reporter's record "consists of [either] the court
reporter's transcription of ... the proceedings" or certified copies of all
recordings of the proceedings with "certified copies of the logs prepared
by the court recorder" and "any. . . exhibits that the parties to the appeal
designate. '20 3 In the event that the court reporter fails to report a pro-
ceeding, the record must contain an objection to the failure of the court
reporter to record the proceedings to preserve the error.20 4 In addition,
"when a [court] reporter's record is necessary for appellate review and
the appellant fails to file the ... record, a presumption arises that the...
record would support the trial court's judgment. 20 5
(O'Neill, J., joined in part by Johnson, J., dissenting). The courts of appeals continued to
apply the principles of Lehmann during the Survey period. For example, in Fisher v.
DeFord Properties, the record on appeal failed "to illustrate that the trial court disposed of
all claims" and parties, so the court of appeals, as instructed by the supreme court in Leh-
mann, abated the appeal and remanded with instructions to the trial court "to disclose
whether it intended the judgment to completely dispose of all claims and all parties." No.
07-04-0389-CV, 2005 WL 146959, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 20, 2005, no pet. h.).
199. Burlington, 167 S.W.3d at 831.
200. 166 S.W.3d 443, 452-53 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
201. Id. at 453. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal relied on the Texas
Government Code, which authorizes the courts of appeals "to determine matters of fact
necessary to proper exercise of jurisdiction," and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which prohibit trial courts from "making order[s] interfering with appellate ... jurisdic-
tion" in the interlocutory appeal context. Id. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c)
(Vernon 2004); TEX. R. App. P. 29.5(b). The court of appeals ultimately concluded that
Rule 12 did not apply and that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. Tri-Steel Structures, Inc.,
166 S.W.3d at 454.
202. TEX. R. App. P. 13.1.
203. TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(a).
204. Rittenhouse v. Sabine Valley Ctr. Found., 161 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2005, no pet. h.).
205. Id. at 165.
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A reporter's record is required only if evidence is introduced in open
court beyond that filed with the clerk. 20 6 The presumption is that "pre-
trial hearings are nonevidentiary absent a specific indication or assertion
to the contrary. '20 7 Thus, "if the proceeding's nature, the trial court's
order, the party's briefs, or other indications show that an evidentiary
hearing took place in open court," then the burden is on the "com-
plaining party [to] present a record of [the] hearing to establish harmful
error."20 8 In the absence of any such evidence, the appellate court
presumes that the hearing was nonevidentiary and that "the trial court
considered only the evidence filed with the clerk. '20 9 To allege that a
hearing was evidentiary, the party must specifically allege "that exhibits
or testimony [were] presented in open court beyond that filed with the
clerk." 210
On appeal of summary judgment, the complaining party bears the bur-
den of presenting a record of the summary-judgment evidence so that the
court of appeals has a basis for reviewing the appellant's claim of harmful
error. 211 In one case decided during the Survey period, the court held
that "if the pertinent summary judgment evidence ... is not included in
the appellate record, an appellate court must presume that the omitted
evidence supports the trial court's judgment. '2 12
VIII. WAIVER ON APPEAL
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(h) requires that a brief contain
concise arguments and appropriate citations to authorities. However, the
Texas Supreme Court has "instructed the courts of appeals to construe
the Rules of Appellate Procedure reasonably, yet liberally, so that the
right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely neces-
sary to effect the purpose of a rule. ' 21 3 In Republic Underwriters Insur-
ance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that
Republic waived its argument regarding a statute because it failed to cite
any authority, aside from the statute itself, as required by Rule 38.1(h). 21 4
Holding that Republic did not waive its argument, the supreme court said
that it was not sure what other authority the court of appeals wanted
Republic to include, especially in light of the fact that the court of appeals
relied solely on the statutory language as well. 215
The Rules of Appellate Procedure also require a petition for review to
"state concisely all issues ... presented for review" and confine the peti-
206. Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782-83 (Tex. 2005).




211. Enter. Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex. 2004).
212. Id. at 550.





tioner's brief to the issues stated in the petition. 216 During the Survey
period, the supreme court liberally applied these rules.
For example, in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Ramirez, the only issue
presented to the court in the petition for review was the legal sufficiency
of the accident reconstruction expert's evidence of causation. 217 The
Ramirezes argued that Volkswagen had thus waived the issue of the legal
sufficiency of the metallurgical expert (Cox). The supreme court dis-
agreed, reasoning that "if the Ramirezes decided to rely on Cox" for cau-
sation opinions in response to Volkswagen's arguments, then "the issue
fairly included both experts. ' 218 A dissenting justice in the case, how-
ever, pointed out that Volkswagen did not complain in its petition about
the legal sufficiency of Cox's testimony. 219 Rather, Volkswagen first chal-
lenged Cox's causation testimony in its reply brief, and even then devoted
only two sentences to the argument. 220 The dissent concluded that al-
lowing review of Cox's testimony rendered the mandates of Rules 53.2(f)
and 55.2 "merely aspirational. ' '22a
Similarly, in Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, the Texas
Supreme Court rejected Holten's argument that Michiana had waived its
right to assert a minimum-contacts challenge by raising it for the first
time in its brief on the merits, rather than its petition for review. 222 The
supreme court found that by challenging the court of appeals' only basis
for finding personal jurisdiction, Michianna's petition necessarily in-
cluded a challenge to minimum contacts because, without that ground,
jurisdiction did not exist.223
Again, in Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp.,224 the Texas Supreme Court reit-
erated that issues "should be liberally construed to fairly and equitably
adjudicate the rights of litigants" and that courts should consider the par-
ties' arguments supporting each issue, rather than the mere wording of
the issues. The supreme court cautioned appellate courts to avoid being
"overly technical in their application. '225
In Bunton v. Bentley,226 the Texas Supreme Court held that the peti-
tioner did not waive his complaint "that the exemplary damages awarded
by the trial court were unconstitutionally excessive," even though he did
not raise that complaint until after the court of appeals issued its judg-
ment. In that case, the court of appeals "reduced the trial court's award
216. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(f), 55.2(f).
217. 159 S.W.3d 897, 909-10 (Tex. 2005).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 914 n.1 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005).
223. Id. at 781.
224. 171 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. 2005) (holding that Union Gas preserved the error and
did in fact appeal the award of attorney's fees, even though its point of error included no
challenges to the attorney's-fee award, because the body of the argument referred to chal-
lenges to the attorney's-fee award).
225. Id.
226. 153 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2004).
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of compensatory damages but left the exemplary damages intact. '22 7 Al-
lowing the complaint of excessiveness, the supreme court explained that
"because ... exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relation to the
• . .actual harm suffered, a claim that exemplary damages are grossly
disproportionate may ... arise any time ... compensatory damages are
• . . adjusted. ' 228 "Ideally, the court of appeals should automatically
reevaluate exemplary damages whenever compensatory damages are
reduced. "229
The supreme court similarly held that State Farm did not waive its no-
trial-plan challenge to the trial court's class-certification order in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,230 even though it did not raise
this argument until the motion for rehearing stage. State Farm had ar-
gued in its initial brief "that a trial court has a duty to identify the sub-
stantive legal issues that will control the litigation's outcome"-one of the
underpinnings of the trial-plan requirement-and the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in Bernal requiring a trial plan was issued after the par-
ties filed their initial briefs with the court of appeals.
IX. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
standard of review that should be applied to a trial court's determination
regarding the necessity of expert testimony. Noting the absence of any
Texas precedent addressing the issue, the court in FFE Transportation
Services, Inc. v. Fulgham concluded that de novo is the proper standard of
review in this context-the trial court's determination as to the require-
ment of expert testimony is not entitled to deference on appeal.
231
The supreme court also answered the question of whether an elevated
standard of proof at trial (for instance, clear and convincing evidence)
requires a correspondingly elevated standard of evidentiary review on ap-
peal. After describing in detail how legal and factual sufficiency review
developed in Texas, the supreme court in Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. v. Garza concluded that "a finding that must meet an elevated stan-
dard of proof must also meet an elevated standard of review.
232
To explain the elevated standard of review for legal sufficiency of the
evidence, the supreme court compared the clear and convincing and pre-
ponderance of the evidence standards of proof.2 33 Under a preponder-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 54.
229. Id.
230. 156 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2004).
231. 154 S.W.3d 84, 89-90 (Tex. 2004). The supreme court noted that it had implicitly
recognized de novo as the proper standard of review in numerous previous cases. Id. at 90
(citing Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., 146 S.W.3d 113, 119 (Tex. 2004); Texarkana Mem'l
Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. 1997); Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793
S.W.2d 948, 954 (Tex. 1990); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex.
1987); Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Tex. 1971)).
232. 164 S.W.3d 607, 619-22 (Tex. 2004).
233. Id. at 621.
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ance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, evidence that does no more than
create "a mere surmise or suspicion" (the "scintilla" rule) cannot show
that something is more likely than not.234 But when the proof required is
clear and convincing, "even evidence that does more than raise surmise
and suspicion will not suffice unless it is capable of producing a firm be-
lief or conviction that the allegation is true. '235 "Evidence of lesser qual-
ity is, in legal effect, no evidence. '236
Accordingly, a court "reviewing a finding that must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence" cannot be guided by the "scintilla" rule be-
cause, even if the evidence supporting the finding amounts to more than a
scintilla (and, therefore, would be legally sufficient to support a finding
under a preponderance-of-the-evidence review), "the finding is invalid
unless the evidence is also clear and convincing. ' 237 Instead, "a finding
that must meet an elevated standard of proof must also meet an elevated
standard of review." 238
The supreme court in Garza went on to explain that, in conducting a
no-evidence review in a case requiring clear and convincing evidence, the
reviewing court "should look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. ' 239
Significantly, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding, the reviewing court can and should "disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been in-
credible. ' 240 Additionally, the reviewing court is not required to "disre-
gard all evidence that does not support the finding."'24' As the court
explained, "[djisregarding undisputed facts that do not support the find-
ing could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing
evidence. "242
In two cases decided shortly after Garza, the supreme court in Quest
International Communications v. AT & T Corp.243 and Diamond Sham-
rock Refining Co., L.P. v. HalP244 applied Garza's elevated standard of
review to reverse jury findings of malice (Quest International) and gross





238. Id. at 622.
239. Id. at 627.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. In a concurring opinion (concurring only in the majority's judgment), Justice
O'Neill argued that, by "stretch[ing] the definition of 'undisputed evidence' to include any
testimony that was not directly contradicted," the majority was essentially (and improp-
erly) weighing the evidence relevant to the jury's malice finding and "misstat[ing] the role
that truly undisputed evidence should play in a legal sufficiency analysis." Id. at 632
(O'Neill, J., concurring).
243. 167 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).
244. 168 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2005).
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job was to review "all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's finding, taking into account contrary undisputed facts, to determine
whether reasonable jurors could have formed a firm belief or conviction
regarding malice. ' 245 Applying this standard, the supreme court con-
cluded that "based on all the evidence, reasonable jurors could have
formed a firm belief that [defendant] acted with negligence, but not
malice. "246
Again, in Hall, the supreme court applied Garza's elevated standard of
review in assessing the evidence supporting the jury's finding of gross
negligence.247 And, once again, after combing through all of the evi-
dence, the supreme court concluded that, while the defendant might have
been negligent, there was no clear and convincing evidence of the lack of
concern necessary for a finding of gross negligence. 248
The Survey period also saw the supreme court revisiting the standard
of review for determining whether an award of exemplary damages is
excessive. In Bunton v. Bentley, the court of appeals ordered a significant
remittitur of compensatory damages (from $7 million to $150,000), but
failed to reevaluate the exemplary damage award ($1 million) to deter-
mine if it was reasonably proportionate to the reduced compensatory
damage amount.249
The supreme court held that this failure was error and remanded the
case to the court of appeals to conduct a reevaluation of the exemplary
damage award. 250 In doing so, the supreme court reiterated that "exem-
plary damages must be reasonably proportionate to compensatory dam-
ages, and an . . . adjustment of compensatory damages . . . requires
reevaluation of the factors supporting an award of exemplary dam-
ages. '25 1 Those factors include "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3)
the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. '252 The su-
preme court specifically warned that "these factors ... cannot be viewed
in isolation" but "are intertwined with each other. ' 253 Accordingly, a re-
viewing court cannot conclude that due-process requirements are met
based simply on the ratio of compensatory to exemplary damages.254 In-
stead, the court on appeal must examine, de novo, the ratio "in light of
245. Quest Int'l, 167 S.W.3d at 326.
246. Id. at 327.
247. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170.
248. Id. at 173 ("What separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defen-
dant's state of mind: in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about
the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care.").
249. 153 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
250. Id. at 54.
251. Id. at 53.
252. Id. at 53-54 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).




the other factors and in light of the actual harm to the plaintiff. '255
Finally, in City of Keller v. Wilson, the Texas Supreme Court clarified
the standard for no-evidence review. While the issue was whether the
City's approval of drainage plans, which resulted in flooding of the plain-
tiff's property, was an intentional governmental taking, the bulk of the
opinion addresses the proper standard for no-evidence review.25 6 As
framed by the court, the question is this: "Must an appellate court review-
ing a verdict for legal sufficiency start by considering all the evidence or
only part?" 2 57 The answer is this: It does not matter, so long as both
standards are properly applied. 258 The court explained:
Rules and reason sometimes compel that evidence must be credited
or discarded whether it supports a verdict or contradicts it. Under
either scope of review, appellate courts must view the evidence in
the light favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if rea-
sonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless rea-
sonable jurors could not. 259
In its analysis, the supreme court identified the two prevailing articula-
tions of the standard of review for no-evidence, calling them the "exclu-
sive" and "inclusive" standards of review.2 60 Under the "exclusive"
standard of review, the court on appeal "consider[s] only the evidence
and inferences that tend to support the [jury's] finding and disregard all
evidence and inferences to the contrary. 2 6 1 Under the "inclusive" stan-
dard, the "reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light
favorable to the verdict.2 62
The supreme court found the two standards not inconsistent. 263
Rather, the court's principle point seemed to be that sometimes evidence
contrary to the verdict cannot be ignored.264 Contrary "contextual evi-
dence" cannot be ignored because, in some cases, the lack of evidence
supporting the existence of a vital fact may not appear until all the evi-
dence is reviewed in context. 265 Further, "evidence that might be 'some
evidence' when considered in isolation is nevertheless rendered 'no evi-
255. Id. The supreme court similarly took the Austin Court of Appeals to task in Na-
tional Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rowe for failing to apply the "rigorous analysis" stan-
dard of review for class-certification rulings that it had laid down in Southwestern Refining
Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000). Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389,
390 (Tex. 2005). Instead of applying Bernal, the court of appeals reviewed the ruling by
"view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's action." Id. at 392.
Condemning this deferential standard of review, the supreme court reiterated that "actual,
not presumed, conformance with [TEX. R. Civ. P. 42] remains . . . indispensable." Id.
256. 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005).
257. Id. at 807.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 809.
261. Id. at 808-09.
262. Id. at 809.
263. Id. at 822.
264. See id. at 807.
265. Id. at 811.
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dence' when contrary evidence shows it to be incompetent. '2 66 Such evi-
dence, the supreme court held, "cannot be disregarded. '267 Similarly,
conclusive evidence that is contrary to the verdict cannot be ignored:
Proper legal-sufficiency review prevents reviewing courts from sub-
stituting their opinions on credibility for those of the jurors, but
proper review also prevents jurors from substituting their opinions
for undisputed truth. When evidence contrary to a verdict is conclu-
sive, it cannot be disregarded. 268
The supreme court, of course, also acknowledged that much contrary
evidence-such as credibility evidence, conflicting evidence, and conflict-
ing inferences-must be disregarded. 269 "[R]eviewing courts must disre-
gard evidence contrary to the verdict far more often than they must
consider it."'270
The final test for legal sufficiency ... must always be whether the
evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to
reach the verdict under review. Whether a reviewing court begins by
considering all the evidence or only the evidence supporting the ver-
dict, legal-sufficiency review in the proper light must credit favorable
evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence
unless reasonable jurors could not.27 1
266. Id. at 813.
267. Id. at 812.
268. Id. at 816-17.
269. Id. at 818-21.
270. Id. at 818-19.
271. Id. at 827. Ultimately, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals, concluding that the court of appeals had improperly felt compelled by the scope of
review to disregard evidence that the City presented. This evidence would have shown
that the City had approved the plan only because three sets of engineers had said that no
drainage ditch was necessary across plaintiffs property to prevent flooding. Id. at 829.
Finding the court of appeals' refusal to consider this evidence in error, the supreme court
noted: "A reviewing court cannot evaluate what the City knew by disregarding most of
what it was told." Id.
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